<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Logic of Collective Action</title>
	<atom:link href="http://gondwanaland.com/mlog/2004/11/20/logic-of-collective-action/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://gondwanaland.com/mlog/2004/11/20/logic-of-collective-action/</link>
	<description>My opinions only. I do not represent any organization in this publication.</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2008 09:05:20 +0000</pubDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.5</generator>
		<item>
		<title>By: Mike Linksvayer &#187; Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference</title>
		<link>http://gondwanaland.com/mlog/2004/11/20/logic-of-collective-action/#comment-3768</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike Linksvayer &#187; Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Jan 2006 04:41:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://gondwanaland.com/mlog/2004/11/19/logic-of-collective-action/#comment-3768</guid>
		<description>[...] At the top of this post I said that the assumption the assumption of instrumental voting by public choice theory is relatively unknown to me. My very uneducated summary of the insight of public choice can be summed up as &#8220;concentrated interests trump diffuse interests.&#8221; The reason I considered theories of voting unimportant in this context is that voters are obviously diffuse. In my mind, the concentrated interests are not voter blocs, but organizations that manage to overcome the obstacles to collective (political) action (e.g., individual corporations, trade groups, and unions) and politicians themselves. I&#8217;m not sure what, if any, impact expressive voting has on this side of public choice theory. One impact may be that expressive voting within organizations lowers the bar for collective action. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] At the top of this post I said that the assumption the assumption of instrumental voting by public choice theory is relatively unknown to me. My very uneducated summary of the insight of public choice can be summed up as &#8220;concentrated interests trump diffuse interests.&#8221; The reason I considered theories of voting unimportant in this context is that voters are obviously diffuse. In my mind, the concentrated interests are not voter blocs, but organizations that manage to overcome the obstacles to collective (political) action (e.g., individual corporations, trade groups, and unions) and politicians themselves. I&#8217;m not sure what, if any, impact expressive voting has on this side of public choice theory. One impact may be that expressive voting within organizations lowers the bar for collective action. [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
