Post Economics

Accelerating cars

Saturday, August 6th, 2005

Late last month an article in the New York Times says the Bush administration embargoed a scheduleed report on automotive fuel effeciency till after an energy bill vote (an improvement over outright lying). The article features several experts complaining “automakers are failing to improve fuel economy.” Average fuel efficiency of new cars has declined since 1987 (by about 5.4% according to the report). However, the report contains far more incredible statistics (see VIII. Conclusions, page 76 of the report):

Compared to 1987, this year’s fleet is 21 percent heavier, 24 percent faster, and 80 percent more powerful.

Additionally auto fatalities have continued to slowly decline and cars have ever more accoutrements (including mandatory ones of questionable value). And fuel efficiency has only declined by 5.4%? I can only be in awe of the car industry’s technological tour de force.

If anyone is to blame for declining fuel efficiency it is car buyers. Efficiency improved from 1987 in nearly every class of vehichle (e.g., “small car”, “large SUV”). Consumers have been buying more large vehichles, fewer small vehicles. This seems particularly true in the supposedly eco-conscious San Francisco bay area, where there appear to be a greater proportion of large SUVs on the road than anywhere I’ve travelled.

Although I’m impressed by the auto industry’s prowess, they’ll have to do much better to win me as a customer. I’ve never owned a car, though my wife drives a 1998 Saturn SL, among the lowest cost cars of its vintage by several metrics (purchase, maintenance, fuel efficiency, safety, theft). If I had to buy a car today for some reason it would be a very used Volvo, though I’d prefer to stay out of the market until driverless cars are available, presumably well after 2010.

$700 billion fraud

Thursday, July 21st, 2005

Dominant assurance contract implementations?

Friday, July 8th, 2005

None yet, but Russ Nelson left a comment on a Slashdot article about using Fundable for open source software saying that he has plans to modify the Public Software Fund so it allows for dominant assurance contracts.

Just in case the people behind Fundable were not aware of the concept I just suggested that they also offer dominant assurance contracts.

Separately, see Kragen Sitaker’s explanation of assurance contracts as put options inspired by Anton Sherwood’s description of using call options rather than eminent domain to acquire land for a road or pipeline.

Constructive Engagement

Tuesday, July 5th, 2005

Fareed Zakaria in How To Change Ugly Regimes and Leon Hardar in Trading, Not Invading: US Hums Different Tune on Vietnam understand what Robert Scheer and Robert Wright understand, that which apologists for the invasion of Iraq and some of its anti-market opponents do not understand. Zakaria:

I realize that it feels morally righteous and satisfying to “do something” about cruel regimes. But in doing what we so often do, we cut these countries off from the most powerful agents of change in the modern world—commerce, contact, information. To change a regime, short of waging war, you have to shift the balance of power between the state and society. Society needs to be empowered. It is civil society—private business, media, civic associations, nongovernmental organizations—that can create an atmosphere which forces change in a country. But by piling on sanctions and ensuring that a country is isolated, Washington only ensures that the state becomes ever more powerful and society remains weak and dysfunctional. In addition, the government benefits from nationalist sentiment as it stands up to the global superpower. Think of Iraq before the war, which is a rare case where multilateral sanctions were enforced. As we are discovering now, the sanctions destroyed Iraq’s middle class, its private sector and its independent institutions, but they allowed Saddam to keep control.

Bush and some of his most virulent opponents have a different understanding: markets must be spread by force, because markets are good and because markets are evil respectively.

Autonomous Liberalization

Thursday, June 23rd, 2005

Tyler Cowen gives CAFTA a very qualified endorsement which I mostly agree with. The clincher:

Failure of the treaty would be a disaster, again for symbolic reasons. Trade negotiations would slow down significantly, and the age of trade agreements might be over.

What age of trade agreements? According to the World Bank’s World Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism, and Development unilateral trade liberalization accounts for two thirds of tariff reductions over the past twenty years. Regional agreements like CAFTA only accounted for ten percent.

Downgrade symbolism and upgrade strategy: unilateral free trade is the way forward, followed by worldwide agreements, the latter spurred by the former. And drop the non-trade stuff, like exporting intellectual protectionism.

Still, I find it hard to not root for CAFTA, if only because the economic neanderthals on the other side are so ugly.

(CAFTA is doubtless a very ugly treaty too, with payoffs and exceptions galore. Dare I say that those pursuing treaties rather than unilateral liberalization overestimate public good problems and underestimate rent seeking problems?)

Sort of open source economic models

Tuesday, June 14th, 2005

Mark Thoma is building an “open source” repository for economic models. Well, sort of open source. Unfortunately none of the four models included so far, nor the initial post, which Thoma says is open source, say anything about copyright or licenses.

Unfortunately under this default copyright regime, explicit licensing (or dedication to the public domain) is required for an open source project to scale. If five people contribute to a model posted to Thoma’s repository none of the contributors, including the original author, nor anyone else, has any right to distribute the resulting model, or allow others to further modify the model.

That’s why open source projects use explicit open source licenses and open source repositories require each project in the repository to use an explicit license. That’s what an open source economic models repository, or indeed any repository that wants to emulate the open source model, should also do.

NB creators of open source economic models may wish to consider an open source-like license intended for “content” rather than code, e.g., the Free Documentation License (that’s what Wikipedia uses) or a liberal Creative Commons license (e.g., Attribution or Attribution-ShareAlike).

Also see the open access movement, commons-based peer production and Science Commons. I don’t know how familiar the mainstream economics profession is familiar with these concepts, but “they” ought to be.

Via Alex Tabarrok.

Zocalo experiment

Saturday, June 11th, 2005

Friday afternoon I saw a demo by Chris Hibbert of Zocalo, to be an open source platform for running markets. The demo involved playing an apparently classic experimental economics game originally run by Charles Plott.

The game was extremely simple, but more educational for me regarding the methods of experimental economics than having read the occasional popular account over the years. I imagine that such games could be useful in basic education. The dynamics of power seem more intuitive than the dynamics of exchange, yet the former (politics, war and history seen through their lens) gets far more time (possibly this has something to do with the phenomenon of overestimating market failure and underestimating political failure). Perhaps in the near future youth participation in virtual world economies will help fill this educational gap.

Also of note: As of the demo Zocalo is built on mod_pubsub (roughly javascript client in browser keeps http connection open to server, allowing real time updates, no polling and no flash, java or similar required) and has a cool logo. I look forward to the results of further development.

Read the white paper: Zocalo: An Open-Source Platform for Deploying Prediction Markets.

Betting Policy Consequences

Thursday, June 9th, 2005

Michael Stastny quoting a closed Financial Times column:

President John F. Kennedy helped to revive the City of London in 1963 by imposing a tax on US investment in foreign securities. That made the international bond market move to London, allowing the City to regain its 19th century status as Wall Street’s rival in capital markets.

I did not know this bit of history. It seems like a perfect illustration of some obvious but often ignored truth, perhaps simply that policies have consequences. Consideration of more than policy advocates’ lies may be in order. Betting market prices may be one valuable source of more information.

A small irony then, that U.S. regulation is ensuring that the leading betting markets are located outside the U.S., largely in London. Eventually this may be a big deal:

It does not sound like a very worrying loss for Wall Street given its strong position in equities, bonds and derivatives. But Mr Bloomberg should watch out: in an arena of financial innovation that is rapidly converging with other forms of trading and investment, New York is drifting behind London.

As an anti-nationalist, I don’t care much where the leading markets locate; I just hate to see stupid policy implemented anywhere, including the U.S. If I were betting on the consequences of this policy I’d short New York.

Financial markets too gauche? Think through the likely consequences of heavy handed cloning regulation.

Kragen Sitaker on Dominant Assurance Contracts

Thursday, June 2nd, 2005

Kragen Sitaker thinks out loud about dominant assurance contracts for funding public goods, especially free software. My first post on dominant assurance contracts is here. A few thoughts regarding Kragen’s analysis follow.

On public goods:

Generally public goods tend to be underprovided

Almost by definition, but my intuition is that there are important and almost universally unacknowledged exceptions where the good is nonrival, production generates large private benefits, consumption opportunities are limited, or perhaps some combination of these, e.g., recorded music. However, I have no rigorous backing for this intuition. Todo: read existing literature on socially optimal copyright.

[Richard Stallman] would be a happier man today had he spent those years [writing free software] not working with computers at all

I don’t know whether Stallman is happy, but this sounds suspect. He has gained tremendous personal benefits through his programming that he probably couldn’t have obtained otherwise (though perhaps this does not matter, as he shouldn’t have expected to become famous and leader of a very significant movement, unless he was a megalomaniac). It would be more interesting and clearer to make a case that the modal free software contributor acts selflessly, but that would be a long argument and beside the point, which I suppose is simply that unselfish action can produce some public goods.

On dominant assurance contracts:

I suspect that the analysis extends to a more general case, in which each contributor chooses the amount of their own contribution $S, the escrow agent performs the project if the total contributions are over some basic amount, and the extra refund is a specified percentage of the contribution rather than a specified dollar amount; but Tabarrok does not mention this in his paper.

Looks like a very useful extension.

However, copyright places the risk on the artist, while dominant assurance contracts place the risk on the artist’s fans.

I think here the risk is of a worse than expected work. It ought to be possible for an artist to assume more risk by making fulfillment of the contract (and thus not having to refund contributions plus a penalty) contingent on some agreed and hopefully minimally gameable quality measure.

[Update 20050605:On second thought I’m confusing (or extending) the dominant assurance contract idea, which only stipulates that a failure penalty be paid when not enough resources are raised, not when a successfully funded project is not successfully completed.]

Someone also asked whether it was possible to model a dominant assurance contract as a normal assurance contract with a separate prediction market, like the Iowa Electronic Markets, in which people traded idea futures on the likelihood of the completion of the funding. I don’t know how to model it in those terms, although it might be possible.

I don’t know how to model an assurance contract plus prediction market hedging either, but I suspect it may not work as well as a dominant assurance contract.

First, with a dominant assurance contract only contributors receive a payoff in the case of failure. If contribution and failure payoff are unbundled, how are incentives to contribute any different than a plain assurance contract? One can hedge against failure without contributing to sucess.

Second, risk and management of risk is transferred from the entrepreneur to the contributor. Managing risk by hedging securities is hard and costly. The entrepreneur offering the contract may be far more capable of managing risk than contributors.

Prediction market prices may prove helpful to entrepreneurs and potential contributors in deciding what contracts to offer and accept, but this is orthogonal to the structure of dominant assurance contracts, which attack contribution problems rather than revelation problems.

Finally, Tabarrok suggests that the market for escrow agents should be highly competitive because there are low barriers to entry — all you have to do is write a three-line contract and hold some money, assuming that the possible contributors first hold some kind of competition to select which escrow agent they want to use. I think that’s a big assumption, and that escrow agents are likely to wield substantial market power by virtue of network effects, and consequently extract substantial profits from this business.

A well-known escrow agent will be able to attract many more contributors, and so will be able to require much less money from each, which is likely to be a large incentive to use the well-known
agent.

Tabarrok does not mention escrow agents, who may well be involved, but I see no reason to assume the market for such services should be any less competitive than any other market for financial intermediaries. He says that he expects the market for contract providers to be competitive. Presumably these will be entrepreneurs with an expertise in producing a particular public good or aggregators. We have examples of these, from contractors to the United Way or eBay. How would dominant assurance contracts alter the competitive landscape, for better or worse?

[Update 20050605:The distinction I draw between escrow agents and contract providers may not be relevant. It appears that Fundable acts as an aggregator/marketplace and an escrow agent. Also, citing eBay may not inspire confidence. I’ve read, but cannot find a cite for, that it has 85% market share in the US person-to-person online auction market. Whether this is something to worry about will be in the eye of the beholder, e.g., what “market” is relevant — eBay faces indirect competition from garage sales, new goods at retail, and everything in between. Kragen will “just” have to work on zFundable.]

Kragen also has good thoughts on how dominant assurance contracts could prove useful in several fields, potential problems, and responses to several irrelevant objections. Read the whole thing and see Tabarrok’s paper and recent post without which none of the current discussants would be aware of the idea.

Public Goods Rent Seeking

Wednesday, June 1st, 2005

Bryan Caplan points to a fascinating paper on the economics of extreme religious groups which explains the relationship of public goods produced by such groups and sacrifice demanded by the same. Caplan writes:

The upshot is that economists overestimate the severity of public goods problems but underestimate the severity of rent-seeking.

I think Caplan probably has the upshot of this particular paper wrong (I haven’t read the whole paper carefully yet, more later perhaps) but I suspect he’s correct about a bias to overestimate public goods problems and underestimate rent seeking. I wonder if anyone has attempted to detect such a bias either experimentally (in an economics lab) or through painful survey of various popular and academic literatures?

I’m pleased that Ernest Miller made the connection to copyright, though he riffs off the weaker part of Caplan’s post.

Copyright is (should be) the textbook case of wildly overestimating the public goods problem while ignoring rent seeking problems (NB “how can an artist make a full time living doing only art” is not a public goods problem). Witness massive production of art where expected profit from sales of copies and licensing is nil, both outside the content industry and where restrictions on copying are not enforced. Consider who benefits from perpetual copyright — not the public.