Post Public Goods

Down and Out with the Macxs

Wednesday, December 28th, 2005

I expected to enjoy by and have a really hard time finishing by . The former includes cool stuff like , , and . The latter is set in an incredibly challenging environment (in terms of holding my interest)–a . I experienced the reverse.

Manfred Macx, an open source entrepreneur of the future (very approximately), has a kid with his IRS agent luddite wife. They and their descendents carry their family squabbles across the universe and singularity. As this incredibly non-interesting story unfolds, Accelerando takes every opportunity to reference , , and obscure political cliches and inside jokes, without any real depth.

Accelerando was originally written as ten stories, many of which won awards, and several of which I can imagine being enjoyable as shorts. The book is way too long.

If you can put up with lots of enjoy science fiction, you’ll probably like Accelerando. Everyone else, skim the to pick up any missing memes. Peter McCluskey has a better Accelerando review.

Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom is short and concerns the fate of a theme park ride rather than the fate of the universe. Theme park rides are run by . The only way for an ad hoc to take over a ride is to have such an obviously better plan for it that nobody resists–but not everyone wants to play by the rules.

Much is left unexplained (e.g, how does cleaning bathrooms immediately boost one’s ?), but the core ideas Doctorow explores infect every page, making the book the most thought provoking treatise on Disney theme park rides ever.

What would an economy driven by open source concepts and (post-capitalist but not necessarily post-market?) look like? This is a concern of both books. Neither has concrete answers, but Down and Out does a fair job of toying with the question, cat-like, in its limited domain.

Both authors are trying primitive versions of these ideas in the real world, having released Accelerando and Down and Out under licenses. You can download the books here and here. I commend both authors for this and for even attempting to write human stories about such abstract and interesting topics.

Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference

Friday, November 25th, 2005

Democracy and Decision, a 1993 book by economist/philosopher and political philosopher , undermines a relatively little known (to me) side of –the assumption that voters vote in accordance with their () interests.

The authors make a convincing case that because an individual voter is essentially never decisive, the rational voter will vote expressively, even if the vote that gains the voter the highest expressive value would be against the voter’s instrumental interests, if the voter were decisive. The authors summarize their proposition as “Rational action ⇏ psuedorational voting.”

The following rendition of Table 2.2. Electoral choice as a quasi-prisoners’ dilemma (p. 28) illustrates a simple case where voters will vote according to their expressive values and against their instrumental values, as their probability of casting a decisive vote approaches nil.

  All others
Each Majority for a Majority for b Tie (probability → 0)
Vote for a 5 105 5
Vote for b 0 100 100

The authors make a reasonable case that voters’ instrumental and expressive values often are divergent. War seems to be a particularly strong case (p. 50):

How is it, then, that such mammoth exercises in irrationality seem to have been pursued so vigorously and with such popular enthusiasm in this most democratic of ages? The voters’ dilemma provides a possible explanation. Consider the individual voter contemplating a vote between competing political candidates in a setting where international relations are tense. One candidate offers a policy of appeasement, recognizing the enormous cost in lives and resources that any antagonistic stance might involve. the other candidate stands for national integrity — “By God, we are not going to be pushed around by these bastards.” We might well presume that few voters, making a careful calculation of the costs and benefits to themselves and those they care about, would actually opt for war. Just as individuals, in situations of interpersonal strain, will often swallow their pride, shrug their shoulders, and stroll off rather than commit themselves to an all-out fight (particularly one that might imply someone’s death), so the interest of most voters would be better served by drawing back from the belligerent course. Yet a careful reflective computation of the costs and benefits of the alternative outcomes to herself (and those others relevant to her concerns) is precisely what the voter does not entertain: Any such computation is essentially irrelevant. What is relevant, we might suppose, is the opportunity to show one’s patriotism, one’s antipathy to servility, one’s strength of national purpose.

Of course expressive preferences may be for peace instead. In either case, and for any issue, the main point is that “it will be the symbolic power of the policy rather than the costs and benefits the policy scatters on particular voters that will be most relevant.” (p. 51, emphasis in original)

A chapter is devoted to the probability that a vote is decisive–roughly speaking, the probability an election is decided by one vote, given an odd number of votes. It turns out the calculation of this probability is not straightforward, but any reasonable attempt seems to result in an infinitesimal value.

and widespread belief in the argument against voting for minor party candidates would seem to indicate that voters do not vote expressively (surely the proportion of voters who could increase their expressive returns by voting for a “third party” candidate is higher than the roughly one percent who actually do so in U.S. presidential elections). However, at least four non-instrumental factors explain strategic voting: established parties have economies of scale in advertising, rationally habitual voting, voting for a candidate’s top competitor may give the highest expressive returns if a voter’s primary expresive desire is to “boo” the candidate, and being seen as voting “responsibly” is itself an expressive return.

One possibility I believe the authors do not address is that voters may irrationally believe there is a significant probability that their votes may be decisive. After all, the probability calculation is not obvious, and people presumably have terrible intuitions about very large (or small) numbers. The only two small hints of voter irrationality I noticed were on page 121–some voters may be irrationally instrumental–and the following odd quote from page 171:

One who intends through his vote to bring about the election of candidate X is on all fours with someone who steps on a crack with the intention of thereby breaking his grandmother’s back. Irrespective of what they may believe they are doing, they are in fact not acting intentionally to secure favored outcomes.

The fundamental lesson of the domination of voters’ instrumental preferences by expressive preferences is that homo economicus is a poor model for voter behavior.

Another way to put this is to distinguish “p-preferences” (those expressed when voting) from “m-preferences” (market preferences, or those expressed when the actor is decisive). The authors then discuss “r-preferences” (outcomes an actor may prefer upon reflection, but finds himself unwilling to act upon, e.g., a glutton may reflectively prefer to refuse a third serving of cake, but not actually do so) and the related concept of , items underconsumed even in ideal markets.

Voting dominated by expressive preferences could lead to the political provision of merit goods. However, demerit goods could also be provided.

The authors close with an analysis of the constitutional implications of expressive voting, e.g., what does it mean for federalism, the secret ballot, or representative democracy? Nothing is said in this chapter that hasn’t been said countless times without the benefit of a theory of expressive voting.

At the top of this post I said that the assumption the assumption of instrumental voting by public choice theory is relatively unknown to me. My very uneducated summary of the insight of public choice can be summed up as “concentrated interests trump diffuse interests.” The reason I considered theories of voting unimportant in this context is that voters are obviously diffuse. In my mind, the concentrated interests are not voter blocs, but organizations that manage to overcome the obstacles to collective (political) action (e.g., individual corporations, trade groups, and unions) and politicians themselves. I’m not sure what, if any, impact expressive voting has on this side of public choice theory. One impact may be that expressive voting within organizations lowers the bar for collective action.

There’s more to be said about the book, particularly on merit goods and related subjects (but it’s been a few months since I read Democracy and Decision, and my grasp on the subtleties is fading fast) and much more on the implications of expressive preferences outside the context of electoral contests, a subject the authors explicitly do not cover.

Imagine a one-year usufruct

Tuesday, October 18th, 2005

It warms my heart to see a column titled Imagine a world without copyright in the International Herald-Tribune, but I’m afraid Joost Smiers and Marieke van Schijndel imagine too much from such a world:

What is interesting about this approach is that this proposal strikes a fatal blow to a few cultural monopolists who, aided by copyright, use their stars, blockbusters and bestsellers to monopolize the market and siphon off attention from every other artistic work produced by artists. That is problematic in our society in which we have a great need for that pluriformity of artistic expression.

I have great sympathy with this hope, indeed it is one of the things that first interested me in copyright. There is some very imperfect evidence from China that without copyright mass culture will still be star-driven and repulsive.

The authors also do not describe a world completely without copyright, offering creators a one-year exclusive right to exploit new works commercially (a one-year usufruct as they say) where the work demands sizeable initial investments. An unfortunate proposal: to protectionists, a ridicuously constrained mononpoly, but one that undermines the authors’ vision. Better to use the paragraph to mention ideas for financing of artistic works that do not require monopoly privilege. Or to mention peer production, open source, or free software, which they do not.

Premium Society

Monday, October 17th, 2005

The Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation and Intellectual Property, released a few days ago, looks like a fairly reasonable set of guidelines for thinking about innovation policy. Their one pager (PDF).

I found the history of the Royal Society for the Arts (sponsor of Adelphi) far more interesting than the charter itself. An excerpt:

The original name of the Society was Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce. However, an alternative name quickly emerged – the “Premium Society”. Until the mid 19th century, the Society offered cash premiums to inventors and artists as a means of encouraging new and progressive works. This means of supporting innovation often meant hostility towards patents. The reasons for the conflict are complex.

Read the rest.

Predict what will be free

Thursday, August 4th, 2005

Jimmy Wales, guest blogging at Lessig’s, has started what promises to be an interesting series of posts on ten things that will be free (as in free software):

[T]his is not a dream list of things which I hope through some magic to become free, but a list of things which I believe are solvable in reality, things that will be free. Anyone whose business model for the next 100 years depends on these things remaining proprietary better watch out: free culture is coming to get you.

For each of the ten, I will try to give some basic (and hopefully not too ambiguous) definitions for what it will mean for each of them to be “solved”, and we can all check back for the next 25 or 50 years to see how we are doing.

In a subsequent post Wales is even more explicit:

[T]he point of naming the list “will be free” rather than “should be free” or “must be free” is that I am making concrete predictions rather than listing a pie in the sky list of things I wish to see.

I’d love to see similar (but shorter term and more thoroughly specified) predictions as claims on a prediction market. With the right set of claims we can more easily talk about, and plan for, which things are more likely to be free, and when.

Thus far Wales has predicted encyclopedias and curricula will be free. I can’t think of any segments that I am fairly certain will be free, are associated with large businesses, and have not already been alluded to in the comments on his first post.

However, regarding widely deployed software (e.g., operating systems, productivity applications) I have a theory explaining why it will be free: Microsoft Windows and Office have a half life–eventually a release of each will be a failure, at which point the only viable alternaives will be free, and any non-free alternaitves will face slow death–think commercial Unixes in the face of Linux. I’m not going to stand by this theory–it probably assumes too little change, of any sort.

EFF15

Monday, August 1st, 2005

The Electronic Frontient Foundation is 15 and wants “to hear about your ‘click moment’–the very first step you took to stand up for your digital rights.

I don’t remember. It musn’t have been a figurative “click moment.” Probably not a literal “click moment” either–I doubt I used a mouse.

A frequent theme of other EFF15 posts seems to be “how I become a copyfighter” or “how I became a digital freedom activist.” I’ve done embarrassingly little (the occasional letter to a government officeholder, Sklyarov protests, the odd mailing list or blog post, running non-infringing P2P nodes, a more often lapsed than not EFF membership), but that’s the tack I’ll take here.

As a free speech absolutist I’ve always found the concept of “digital rights” superfluous. Though knowledge of computers may have helped me understand “the issues,” I needed none to oppose crypto export laws, the clipper chip, CDA, DMCA, perpetual copyright extension and the like. Still, I hold “ditigal rights,” for lack of a better term, near and dear. So how I became a copyfighter of sorts: four “click themes,” one with a “click moment.” All coalesced around 1988-1992, happily matching my college years, which otherwise were a complete waste of time.

First, earliest, and most important, I’d had an ear for “experimental” music since before college. At college I scheduled and skipped classes and missed sleep around WEFT schedule. Nothing was better than great music, and from my perspective, big record companies provided none of it. There was and is more mind-blowingly escastic music made for peanuts than I could hope to experience in many lifetimes. I didn’t have the terms just yet, but it was intuitively obvious that there was no public goods provisioning problem for art, at least not for anything I appreciated, while there was a massive oversupply of abominable anti-art.

Second, somewhere between reading libertarian tracts and studying economics, I hit upon the idea that “intellectual property” may be neither. Those are likely sources anyway–I don’t remember where I first came across the idea. I kept an eye out for confirmation and somewhere, also forgotten, I found a reference to Tom Palmer‘s Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach. Finding and reading the article, which describes intellectual property as a state-granted monopoly privilege developed through rent seeking by publishers and non-monopoly means of producing intangible goods, at my university’s law library was my “click moment.”

Third, I saw great promise in the nascent free software movement, and I wanted to run UNIX on my computer. I awaited 386BSD with baited breath and remember when Torvalds announced Linux on Usenet. I prematurely predicted world domination a few times, but regardless, free software was and is the most concrete, compelling and hopeful sign that large scale non-monopoly production of non-rivalrous goods is possible and good, and that the net facilitates such production, and that freedom on the net and free software together render each other more useful, imporant, and defensible.

Fourth, last, and least important, I followed the cypherpunks list for some time, where the ideas of crypto anarchy and BlackNet were developed. In the ten years or so since the net has not turned inside out nor overturned governments and corporations, yet we are very early in its history. Cypherpunk outcomes may remain vaporware indefinitely, but nonetheless are evocative of the transformational potential of the net. I do not know what ends will occur, but I’ll gladly place my bets on, and defend, the means of freedom and decentralization rather than control and protectionism.

The EFF has done an immense amount of great work over the past 15 years. You should join, and I will update my membership. However, my very favorite thing about the EFF is indirect–I’ve seen co-founder and board member John Gilmore at both drug war and DMCA protests. If you care about digital rights or any rights at all and do not understand descruction of individuals, rights, and societies wreaked by the drug war, there’s no time like the present to learn–the first step needed in order to stand up for your rights.


Blog-a-thon tag:

Reverse bounties improved

Thursday, July 21st, 2005

Gordon Mohr suggested in a comment that as a name Dominant Assurance Contract is no good and perhaps “refund bonus” would be better. That may be right, though “refund bonus” seems to only describe part of the arrangement.

I conducted a brief search for alternatives, unsatisfactory apart from discovering that the term reverse bounty was recently (April) used to describe an offer by a programmer to develop a feature when a certain amount of money is raised (a bounty is offered by someone requesting a feature). At least one reverse bounty successfully raised the amount requested. I cannot tell what happens to contributed funds in the case where the amount requested is not raised. Notably for the successful reverse bounty the developer said they would ‘top up’ the money and ensure the feature got built. A subsequent reverse bounty seems to have raised nothing so far, perhaps in part because it does not appear to come with any guarantee (also the proposed feature is probably has a narrow audience and the reverse bounty is being called a “request for funding”–true, but very dull).

An assurance contract returns contributions (or cancels pledges) in case the amount requested is not raised. A dominant assurance contract returns contributions plus a failure payoff or refund bouns, making it worthwhile for interested parties to contribute even if they believe the contribution threshold will not be met. Both concepts could easily be applied to reverse bounties.

Dominant assurance contract implementations?

Friday, July 8th, 2005

None yet, but Russ Nelson left a comment on a Slashdot article about using Fundable for open source software saying that he has plans to modify the Public Software Fund so it allows for dominant assurance contracts.

Just in case the people behind Fundable were not aware of the concept I just suggested that they also offer dominant assurance contracts.

Separately, see Kragen Sitaker’s explanation of assurance contracts as put options inspired by Anton Sherwood’s description of using call options rather than eminent domain to acquire land for a road or pipeline.

Kragen Sitaker on Dominant Assurance Contracts

Thursday, June 2nd, 2005

Kragen Sitaker thinks out loud about dominant assurance contracts for funding public goods, especially free software. My first post on dominant assurance contracts is here. A few thoughts regarding Kragen’s analysis follow.

On public goods:

Generally public goods tend to be underprovided

Almost by definition, but my intuition is that there are important and almost universally unacknowledged exceptions where the good is nonrival, production generates large private benefits, consumption opportunities are limited, or perhaps some combination of these, e.g., recorded music. However, I have no rigorous backing for this intuition. Todo: read existing literature on socially optimal copyright.

[Richard Stallman] would be a happier man today had he spent those years [writing free software] not working with computers at all

I don’t know whether Stallman is happy, but this sounds suspect. He has gained tremendous personal benefits through his programming that he probably couldn’t have obtained otherwise (though perhaps this does not matter, as he shouldn’t have expected to become famous and leader of a very significant movement, unless he was a megalomaniac). It would be more interesting and clearer to make a case that the modal free software contributor acts selflessly, but that would be a long argument and beside the point, which I suppose is simply that unselfish action can produce some public goods.

On dominant assurance contracts:

I suspect that the analysis extends to a more general case, in which each contributor chooses the amount of their own contribution $S, the escrow agent performs the project if the total contributions are over some basic amount, and the extra refund is a specified percentage of the contribution rather than a specified dollar amount; but Tabarrok does not mention this in his paper.

Looks like a very useful extension.

However, copyright places the risk on the artist, while dominant assurance contracts place the risk on the artist’s fans.

I think here the risk is of a worse than expected work. It ought to be possible for an artist to assume more risk by making fulfillment of the contract (and thus not having to refund contributions plus a penalty) contingent on some agreed and hopefully minimally gameable quality measure.

[Update 20050605:On second thought I’m confusing (or extending) the dominant assurance contract idea, which only stipulates that a failure penalty be paid when not enough resources are raised, not when a successfully funded project is not successfully completed.]

Someone also asked whether it was possible to model a dominant assurance contract as a normal assurance contract with a separate prediction market, like the Iowa Electronic Markets, in which people traded idea futures on the likelihood of the completion of the funding. I don’t know how to model it in those terms, although it might be possible.

I don’t know how to model an assurance contract plus prediction market hedging either, but I suspect it may not work as well as a dominant assurance contract.

First, with a dominant assurance contract only contributors receive a payoff in the case of failure. If contribution and failure payoff are unbundled, how are incentives to contribute any different than a plain assurance contract? One can hedge against failure without contributing to sucess.

Second, risk and management of risk is transferred from the entrepreneur to the contributor. Managing risk by hedging securities is hard and costly. The entrepreneur offering the contract may be far more capable of managing risk than contributors.

Prediction market prices may prove helpful to entrepreneurs and potential contributors in deciding what contracts to offer and accept, but this is orthogonal to the structure of dominant assurance contracts, which attack contribution problems rather than revelation problems.

Finally, Tabarrok suggests that the market for escrow agents should be highly competitive because there are low barriers to entry — all you have to do is write a three-line contract and hold some money, assuming that the possible contributors first hold some kind of competition to select which escrow agent they want to use. I think that’s a big assumption, and that escrow agents are likely to wield substantial market power by virtue of network effects, and consequently extract substantial profits from this business.

A well-known escrow agent will be able to attract many more contributors, and so will be able to require much less money from each, which is likely to be a large incentive to use the well-known
agent.

Tabarrok does not mention escrow agents, who may well be involved, but I see no reason to assume the market for such services should be any less competitive than any other market for financial intermediaries. He says that he expects the market for contract providers to be competitive. Presumably these will be entrepreneurs with an expertise in producing a particular public good or aggregators. We have examples of these, from contractors to the United Way or eBay. How would dominant assurance contracts alter the competitive landscape, for better or worse?

[Update 20050605:The distinction I draw between escrow agents and contract providers may not be relevant. It appears that Fundable acts as an aggregator/marketplace and an escrow agent. Also, citing eBay may not inspire confidence. I’ve read, but cannot find a cite for, that it has 85% market share in the US person-to-person online auction market. Whether this is something to worry about will be in the eye of the beholder, e.g., what “market” is relevant — eBay faces indirect competition from garage sales, new goods at retail, and everything in between. Kragen will “just” have to work on zFundable.]

Kragen also has good thoughts on how dominant assurance contracts could prove useful in several fields, potential problems, and responses to several irrelevant objections. Read the whole thing and see Tabarrok’s paper and recent post without which none of the current discussants would be aware of the idea.

Public Goods Rent Seeking

Wednesday, June 1st, 2005

Bryan Caplan points to a fascinating paper on the economics of extreme religious groups which explains the relationship of public goods produced by such groups and sacrifice demanded by the same. Caplan writes:

The upshot is that economists overestimate the severity of public goods problems but underestimate the severity of rent-seeking.

I think Caplan probably has the upshot of this particular paper wrong (I haven’t read the whole paper carefully yet, more later perhaps) but I suspect he’s correct about a bias to overestimate public goods problems and underestimate rent seeking. I wonder if anyone has attempted to detect such a bias either experimentally (in an economics lab) or through painful survey of various popular and academic literatures?

I’m pleased that Ernest Miller made the connection to copyright, though he riffs off the weaker part of Caplan’s post.

Copyright is (should be) the textbook case of wildly overestimating the public goods problem while ignoring rent seeking problems (NB “how can an artist make a full time living doing only art” is not a public goods problem). Witness massive production of art where expected profit from sales of copies and licensing is nil, both outside the content industry and where restrictions on copying are not enforced. Consider who benefits from perpetual copyright — not the public.