On rare occasions interrupting an activity to check feed subscriptions saves time, e.g., when the activity is writing a blog post on electability implied by prediction market contracts for nomination and election, and a post by David Schneider-Joseph on Nominatibility and Electability shows up that says most of what I wanted to say:
The fact that, in the real world, 2008.PRES.GIULIANI divided by 2008.GOP.NOM.GIULIANI happens to equal 72.2 simply means that, in those scenarios where Giuliani actually ends up being nominated, his electability averages 72.2. But his abstract electability, given the hypothetical scenario in which the Republican Party nominated him without considering other candidates, is not necessarily the same.
This far out one should not read too much into electability implied by prediction market price ratios, but they’ll be interesting to follow anyway, and on primary election or caucus days, and the eve of nomination even moreso, a power-hungry partisan would do well to pay heed (at that point scenarios where candidate A versus B gets nominated differ little excepting that candidate A or B gets nominated).
Of course I’d really like to see a party that nominates the candidate whose nomination is predicted to best further outcomes preferred by the party — platform as a utility function — nomination by futarchy. If a party’s preferred policies are not predicted to lead to a party’s preferred outcomes, a futarchist nominating process could lead to the nomination of the candidate most likely to lose!