William F. Buckley admits that the U.S. military adventure in Iraq is a defeat, but willfully fails to learn anything from it.
It is healthier for the disillusioned American to concede that in one theater in the Mideast, the postulates didn’t work. The alternative would be to abandon the postulates.
His two postulates amount to an assumption that wherever the U.S. intervenes people will act in accordance with U.S. politicians’ wishes. Nevermind that this doesn’t even work within the U.S. jurisdiction.
Buckley attributes defeat soley to “Iraqi animosities.” Even if that were the sole cause blame can be pinned firmly on U.S. politicians who were very well aware of Shiite/Sunni/Kurd/Christian/etc. “animosities” as leveraging these was a major component of U.S. policy toward Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. However, Buckley ignores economic mismanagement, Abu Ghraib and doubtless many other idiocies endemic to political management, nevermind military-political management. To do so would be to accept blame and teeter on the edge of admitting error.
If Buckley hopes to fence off his “postulates” (and thus U.S. policy) from criticism by admitting defeat in this one instance I hope he fails miserably, but I fully expect he and other advocates of interventionism will succeed in this subversion of truth. The long history of poor outcomes of U.S. intervention in the Middle East, elsewhere, and within the U.S. jurisdiction (domestically) is forgotten completely and is never learned from.
Via Mike Godwin. You must check out Godwin’s awesome site design. (Don’t worry, I still hate Macs.)